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MARKET INTEGRATION AND (THE LIMITS OF) 
THE FIRST SALE RULE IN NORTH AMERICAN 
AND EUROPEAN TRADEMARK LAW 
Irene Calboli* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between exclusive trademark rights and 
the free movement of goods across international borders has 
historically represented one of the most heated topics of 
discussion in the international trademark debate.1  In a 
previous work published a few years ago, I analyzed this topic 
in the context of European trademark law and the case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).2  In this 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property and 
Technology Program, Marquette University Law School; Spring 2011 CIPLIT 
Visiting Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.  I would like to 
thank Eric Goldman for the invitation to speak at the ―Exhaustion and First 
Sale in Intellectual Property‖ conference held at Santa Clara University School 
of Law on November 5, 2010, and for his insightful suggestions during the 
research and writing of this Article.  I also thank the conference participants 
and my colleagues Michael O‘Hear and Josh Sarnoff for useful conversation and 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.  Finally, I thank Marquette 
University Law School for research support, Jeremy Hager for research 
assistance, and the editors of the Santa Clara Law Review, and in particular 
Mike Foy, Lara Muller, and Farid Zakaria, for their assistance during the 
editing process of this Article. 
 1. The literature on this topic is extensive.  See, e.g., TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, 
PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1 (1994); Friedrich-Karl 
Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 I.I.C. 48 
(1970); Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade, 28 I.I.C. 
623 (1997); John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the 
Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 31 WORLD 
COMPETITION L & ECON. REV.  75 (1988); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition 
of Parallel Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495 (1999); 
E.C. Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is 
not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959); Charles Worth, Free 
Trade Agreements and the Exhaustion of Rights Principle, 1 E.I.P.R. 40 (1994).  
 2. See Irene Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union: 
Community-Wide or International?  The Saga Continues, 6 MARQ. INTELL. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1892351
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Article I advance this analysis in a larger context: the tension 
between the national exercise of trademark rights and the 
free movement of goods within free trade areas (regional 
trade agreements among sovereign countries) in general, with 
particular attention to the issues related to differences in 
product quality.  Notably, in this Article I explore the 
effectiveness, and the limitations, of the principle of 
―trademark first sale‖ in promoting the free movement of 
goods in free trade areas.  To this end, I compare the 
application of this principle and the resulting market 
integration achieved by two of the most prominent free trade 
areas in the current international context: the North 
American countries with the adoption of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the members of the 
European Union (EU).  Based upon this comparison, I provide 
some specific suggestions and policy considerations as to the 
possible approaches that members of existing and future free 
trade areas can follow to promote and guarantee effective 
market integration and free movement of goods in their 
respective territory.3 
The principle of ―trademark first sale,‖ which is also 
known as ―trademark exhaustion,‖4 represents a milestone in 
 
PROP. L. REV. 47 (2002) (providing a detailed analysis of the development of the 
principle of trademark exhaustion under European trademark law). 
 3. Because of the complexity of this topic and the limited scope of this 
Article, this Article focuses on the analysis of the principle of trademark first 
sale, or trademark exhaustion, only within trademark law and policy.  This 
Article does not address other relevant issues related to the relationship 
between the free movement of goods and international trade in general, nor 
elaborate on the economic aspects, positive and negative, of parallel imports for 
corporations and national economies.  Likewise, this Article does not address 
the frequent antitrust issues that can arise as a result of the monopolistic 
exercise of trademark rights with respect to gray market goods nor other means 
to control product distribution, such as licensing clauses, contracts, or torts.  
This Article also does not extensively elaborate on the differences between the 
theories of ―universality‖ and ―territoriality‖ of trademark protection and the 
preference for a system of ―trademark territoriality‖ that has characterized the 
harmonization of trademark laws among members of the International 
Community.  Finally, this Article does not explore the effect of the Internet and 
e-commerce on the traditional territorial interpretation of the principle of 
trademark exhaustion. 
 4. See FREDERICK M. ABBOT, THOMAS COTTIER & FRANCIS GURRY, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 
270 (2007).  This Article uses the terms ―trademark first sale,‖ ―trademark 
exhaustion,‖ and ―exhaustion of trademark rights‖ interchangeably as 
synonyms. 
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trademark theory.  Trademark law grants trademark owners 
the right to prevent third parties from using identical or 
similar signs to identify confusingly similar products in the 
market.5  Nevertheless, once a trademark owner has 
introduced into the market a product, or a batch of products, 
these rights are considered ―exhausted‖ with respect to those 
products, and the trademark owner can no longer rely on 
trademark rights to control the products‘ future circulation.6  
This principle was developed by the courts in the nineteenth 
century to balance the rights of trademark owners to prevent 
the inappropriate use of their marks with the rights of 
retailers, second-hand dealers, and consumers to freely 
display, advertise, and resell the products that they lawfully 
purchased in the market, even if those actions directly 
compete with the trademark owners‘ business activities in the 
same market.7  Since then, courts have invariably repeated 
and confirmed this principle, which has also been 
incorporated in most national trademark legislations.8   
Traditionally, there has been little dispute about the 
application of the principle of trademark first sale within 
national markets—once distributed for sale in a national 
market, products are generally free to move within the 
domestic territory despite trademark owners‘ desires to 
control future product distribution in that market.9  In 
contrast, fierce disputes have characterized the application of 
this principle in the context of international trade with 
 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.N.Y. 1886); John A. Young, 
Jr., The Gray Market Case: Trademark Rights v. Consumer Interests, 61 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 838, 840 (1986). 
 8. See discussion infra Parts II.A, III.A–B.   
 9. One exception to this principle, however, is the case of countries 
allowing concurrent registration owned by different entities in separate parts of 
the country as, for example, in the United States.  In such a case, the goods 
carrying one of the concurrently registered marks can circulate only in the 
specific part of the United States covered by the registration and cannot be 
marketed in the part of the United States designated for the other concurrent 
registration.  Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) 
(2006) [hereinafter Lanham Act].  Another exception to this principle is the 
coexistence of non-registered and registered marks in the same jurisdiction.  
This Article does not analyze these issues, nor the relationship between state 
and federal trademark registrations in countries permitting the registration of 
marks under their state law and not only at a federal level, as for example in 
the United States. 
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respect to the parallel imports of ―gray market goods‖—i.e., 
genuine (originally manufactured) products, which are 
imported into a country from unauthorized third party 
importers after their first authorized sale by trademark 
owners in another part of the world.10  To some extent, the 
surge in global trade over the past two decades has 
heightened these disputes,11 particularly in the developed 
world economies, driven primarily by the concerns expressed 
by multinational corporations against the arbitrage of 
consumer goods from low-cost to high-cost jurisdictions.12  
Although multinational corporations are interested in the 
benefits of free trade to reduce manufacturing costs and 
decrease tariffs, quotas, and other trade restrictions, they 
generally fear and oppose gray market goods because of the 
competition that these goods create in the high cost domestic 
markets where they are imported, and the resulting loss of 
profits for trademark owners (multinational corporations) in 
those markets.13 
 
 10. This Article uses the terms ―parallel imports‖ and ―gray market goods‖ 
interchangeably as synonyms.  Both parallel imports and gray market goods 
refer to the situation where products carrying a certain mark are imported into 
a market and sold there without the consent of the owner of the mark.  J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 29:46 (4th ed. 2010).  The products are ―genuine‖ and not counterfeit goods, 
and have been manufactured by or under license from the trademark owner.  
Id.  They are, however, formulated or packaged for a particular jurisdiction and 
are imported into a different country than the one intended by the trademark 
owner.  Id.  For extensive analysis on these definitions and relevant literature 
and case law, see id.  See also Heath, supra note 1, at 623 (explaining that the 
term parallel imports ―refers to goods produced and sold legally, and 
subsequently exported‖ and that ―there is nothing ‗grey‘ about them‖). 
 11. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:51–51.75 (offering an overview of 
the regulation of parallel imports in the United States). 
 12. Id. § 29:46, n.1 (including several references to professional articles 
explaining how to prevent or diminish the risk of parallel imports for 
corporations). 
 13. The corporate opposition to the unauthorized importation of gray 
market products is well exemplified in the position adopted by the International 
Trademark Association (INTA).  In a position paper prepared by the 2006–2007 
INTA Parallel Imports Committee, INTA advocated that a regime of national 
exhaustion was in the best interest of trademark owners.  INTA specifically 
―supports the principle that international exhaustion should not apply to 
parallel imports in the absence of clear proof that the trademark owners 
expressly consented to such imports.‖  See INTA, Position Paper on Parallel 
Imports, July 2007, available at http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTA
ParallelImports2007.pdf. 
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In response to these concerns, the protection of 
trademark rights, and intellectual property in general, has 
played an increasingly important role in international trade 
negotiations in the past decades.14  The fundamental 
relationship between intellectual property and international 
trade is at the heart of the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which was enacted 
in 1994 as an integral part of the General Agreement of 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations that led to the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO).15  Still, 
because of diverging national interests among WTO 
members, the exhaustion of intellectual property rights and 
the regulation of parallel imports of gray market goods 
proved too controversial to be addressed within the context of 
TRIPS.  As enacted, TRIPS declares that nothing in the 
Agreement can ―be used to address the issue of the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.‖16  Absent an 
official position at the international level, WTO members 
have continued to follow their preferred policies on the issue, 
thus perpetuating the existing controversy in this area.17 
Notwithstanding the silence in TRIPS and the corporate 
opposition to the principle of trademark first sale, the 
relevance of this principle to promote free trade is 
undisputable.18  As repeated in most free trade agreements, 
the main purpose of free trade is to eliminate all barriers to 
 
 14. See, e.g., Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of 
National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 
AM. U.J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 769 (1997); J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in 
International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 747 (1989). 
 15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULT OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUNDS Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 83 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 16. Id. art. 6. 
 17. On the silence of TRIPS regarding the issue of the exhaustion of all 
intellectual property rights, not solely trademarks, see S.K. Verma, Exhaustion 
of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreements, 29 I.I.C. 534, 539 (1998).  See also Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate 
Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM. L. & 
POL‘Y J. 153 (1995). 
 18. See, e.g., Herman Cohen Jehoram, International Exhaustion versus 
Importation Right: A Murky Area of Intellectual Property Law, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‘L 
280 (1996). 
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―legitimate trade‖19 and to promote the unrestricted 
circulation of goods in the international, regional, or national 
market.20  Accordingly, international trade or trade among 
members of free trade areas can effectively be ―free‖ only if, 
among other trade barriers, the exercise of national 
trademark rights is considered exhausted with respect to the 
distribution of gray market goods after their first lawful sale 
in any country of the world (international trademark 
exhaustion) or at least within the territory of the members of 
free trade areas (regional trademark exhaustion).21 
In recent years, however, even in countries adopting 
regimes of international or regional trademark exhaustion, 
multinational corporations have increasingly raised an 
additional argument against the principle of trademark first 
sale to prevent the importation of gray market goods: the 
―material different product quality‖ of the goods they 
distribute in separate national markets.22  Notably, 
multinational corporations frequently manufacture or 
package products with minor variations in their quality or 
post-sale services to satisfy local preferences, take advantage 
of local requirements, or simply to diversify international 
markets.  Still, they usually market these materially different 
products under the same mark in separate countries because 
of the advantages of brand recognition given the widespread 
international movement of goods and people.23  In recent 
 
 19. See discussion infra Part III.A–B; see also North American Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. Art. 1701(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) 
[hereinafter NAFTA].  
 20. On the differences between national and international exhaustion, see 
generally Jesper Rasmussen, The Principle of Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights 
Pursuant to Directive 89/104 (and Regulation 40/94), 4 E.I.P.R. 174 (1995). 
 21. See discussion infra Part III. 
 22. HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 153. 
 23. Corporations usually cannot, however, intentionally market products of 
different quality under the same mark in a single jurisdiction.  For example, all 
cans of Coca-Cola Classic distributed in the United States by The Coca-Cola 
Company have to be the same in terms of formula, etc., even if The Coca-Cola 
Company can use the ―main‖ mark Coca-Cola for other lines of (qualitatively 
identical) products in the same market (e.g., Coca-Cola Zero), or can decide to 
change the quality of all Coca-Cola Classic cans marketed in the United States 
in the future.  Companies can at times market products of different quality (e.g., 
special releases), but these differences have to be clearly advertised to 
consumers.  In contrast, the intentional distribution of identically looking goods 
of different quality (e.g., Coca-Cola Classic with different ingredients) is 
considered a misleading use of a mark that could lead to cancellation of the 
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years, multinational corporations have repeatedly argued 
that consumers may be confused if two seemingly identical 
but materially different products are sold in the same 
national market under the same mark as a result of the 
importation of gray market products.24  In several instances, 
national courts have accepted this argument and blocked the 
importation of materially different gray market products (also 
from members of the same free trade area) into their national 
territory.25  Not surprisingly, this has in turn undermined the 
process of international market integration and free trade in 
general. 
This Article explores this intricate aspect of trademark 
law and international trade, with particular attention to the 
argument of ―materially different product quality‖ and its 
impact on the effectiveness of the principle of trademark first 
sale to promote free trade internationally and, in particular, 
within free trade areas.  The reminder of this Article proceeds 
as follows.  Part II recounts the history of the principle of 
trademark first sale and illustrates the alternative national 
positions that countries have traditionally adopted with 
respect to the admissibility of gray market goods into their 
territory.  Part III analyzes the different approaches to the 
principle of trademark first sale and the importation of 
materially different gray market goods adopted, specifically, 
by NAFTA and EU members, and the resulting process of 
market integration in those free trade areas.  Part IV 
compares the approaches adopted by NAFTA and EU 
members and stresses that, in general, effective market 
integration in free trade areas can be achieved only by 
adopting uniform national rules that permit parallel imports 
from other members combined with the prohibition of 
domestic measures that limit the importation of genuine but 
materially different products.  In particular, Part IV suggests 
that members of free trade areas can facilitate the long term 
free movement of genuine but materially different products in 
their territory by harmonizing, or at least approximating, 
 
mark and would amount to consumer fraud, at least in the United States.  See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV.A. (considering the issues related to the 
distribution of gray market products of ―materially different‖ quality in the 
national jurisdictions of Canada, the United States, and Mexico). 
 25. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B. 
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national product standards and by adopting the same 
common standards.  As a complementary and more 
immediate solution, however, Part IV highlights that 
members of free trade areas can individually adopt national 
principles of mutual recognition of products coming from 
other members, or accept into their territory the importation 
of gray market goods carrying labels that disclose to the 
public any material difference in product quality.  Because of 
the possible conflicts of the mutual recognition approach with 
the WTO principles of non-discrimination and most-favored-
nation, this Article concludes that the acceptance into the 
domestic markets of the importation of gray market goods 
adequately labeled to prevent consumer confusion seems to 
represent the most effective (although imperfect) approach to 
currently promote free trade in free trade areas alongside the 
harmonization of technical standards.  
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADEMARK FIRST SALE 
AND FREE TRADE 
This Section offers an overview of the principle of 
trademark first sale, and the relationship between this 
principle and international trade.  First, this Section 
illustrates the basic functions of trademarks, the traditional 
scope of trademark protection, and the theory behind the 
principle of trademark first sale as a means to remove 
trademark owners‘ control on product distribution in the 
market.  Second, this Section emphasizes the impact of the 
principle of trademark first sale in international trade and 
the different approaches taken by individual countries, which 
are divided into national, international, and regional 
trademark exhaustion. 
A. Basics of Trademark Protection, Trademark First Sale, 
and Free Trade 
Trademarks perform a variety of functions in the modern 
economy.  First, trademarks enable producers to inform 
consumers about the origin and the quality of their products 
in a market increasingly dominated by similar and competing 
products.26  In addition to indicating commercial origin and 
 
 26. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (―[T]rademark law . . . 
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guaranteeing consistent product quality, trademarks are also 
valuable advertising tools and manifestations of trademark 
goodwill that attract consumers because of the reputation or 
other values that the public attaches to, and associates with, 
the marks.27  Historically, trademark law has protected these 
different trademark functions.28  As mentioned before, the 
core of trademark rights resides in the ability of trademark 
owners to exclude third parties from using identical or similar 
marks on identical or similar products when such use could 
lead to a likelihood of consumer confusion.29  For the owners 
of famous marks, trademark protection also extends to 
identical or similar signs used on non-similar products when 
this use is likely to take unfair advantage of, or damage, the 
mark‘s distinctiveness or reputation.30 
The right of trademark owners to exclude others from 
using identical or similar marks has been traditionally 
limited, however, by the limits imposed upon trademark 
owners by the principle of trademark first sale or trademark 
exhaustion.  This principle explicitly provides that the right 
 
can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote 
economic efficiency.‖); see also Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of 
Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988); William P. Kratzke, 
Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 
205 (1991). 
 27. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 813, 818 (1927) (―The true functions of the trademark are, then, 
to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases 
by the consuming public.‖). 
 28. See, e.g., Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Spyros M. Maniatis, A 
Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality, 11 E.I.P.R. 406 
(1993).  See also the famous passage of the United States Senate Reports 
introducing the Lanham Act and stating that trademark protection has a 
twofold purpose.  S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.  ―One is to protect the public so it may be confident 
that . . . it will get the product which it asks for . . . .  Secondly, where the owner 
of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public 
the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by 
pirates and cheats.‖  Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis, supra note 28, at 406. 
 30. See TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 16(3).  ―Article 6bis of the Paris 
Convention (1967) shall apply . . . to goods and services which are not similar to 
those in respect of which a mark is registered, provided that the use of that 
trademark . . . would indicate a connection between those goods or services and 
the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the 
owner of the registered trademark are likely damaged by such use.‖  Id.  
Because of its limited scope, this Article does not elaborate on individual 
national anti-dilution provisions and leading cases. 
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of a trademark owner ―to control distribution of its 
trademarked product does not extend beyond the first sale of 
the product.‖31  Thus, ―[the] resale by the first purchaser of 
the original article under the producer‘s trademark is neither 
trademark infringement nor unfair competition.‖32  The only 
exception to this principle is that trademark rights are not 
exhausted, and trademark owners can oppose future product 
distribution, when third parties have altered the quality of 
the marked products without the consent of trademark 
owners after the first authorized sale of the products in the 
market.33  In these instances, trademark owners can oppose 
the future circulation of the products that they have initially 
distributed because consumers rely on the marks affixed to 
those products as signs of authenticity as to the products‘ 
origin and quality, and would thus believe that those quality 
alterations originate with, or are authorized by, trademark 
owners.34  This, in turn, would undermine the traditional 
functions of trademarks as indicators of commercial origin 
and guarantors of consistent quality, and would also unfairly 
affect and damage the reputation of trademark owners.35 
Theoretically, the principle of trademark first sale finds 
its rationale in the assumption that trademarks must not be 
used as a tool to control market distribution or as a means of 
market division contrary to their function as indicators of 
commercial origin and product quality.36  Whether third 
parties resell trademarked products after their first 
authorized sale in the market with or without the trademark 
 
 31. Sebastian Int‘l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th 
Cir. 1995).  The premise of the first sale is that ―the consumer gets exactly what 
the consumer bargains for, the genuine product of the particular producer.‖  Id. 
at 1075. 
 32. Id. at 1074. 
 33. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:37 (offering an extensive analysis of 
the relevant statutes and cases under U.S. law).  Because of its limited scope, 
this Article does not elaborate on the issue of the sale of ―expired‖ products and 
whether the principle of first sale is applicable in those instances.  According to 
this Author, in the instance of products with a mandatory expiration because of 
safety standards, the sale of expired products is directly forbidden regardless of 
whether the products are sold by trademark owners or third party importers.  
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Beier, supra note 1, at 61–62; Cohen Jehoram, supra note 18, at 280.  
See also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:51.75 (discussing the quality function 
of trademarks in the context of parallel imports). 
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owners‘ authorization, these sales do not imperil traditional 
trademark functions nor do they create consumer confusion 
with respect to the marked products—the products are and 
remain genuine (original) products and the marks continue to 
indicate to consumers the products‘ commercial origin and 
quality regardless of the identity of the actual distributor of 
the goods.37  Undoubtedly, the unauthorized sale of genuine 
products limits trademark owners‘ ability to control the 
channeling of their products in the market, including their 
ability to portray the goods under specific conditions of 
desirability or exclusivity.  These sales also create additional 
competition for trademark owners.38  Trademark law, 
however, has never protected the ability of trademark owners 
to design the conditions under which products are released 
into the market because this would necessarily create 
trademark monopolies.39 
Historically, the origin of the principle of trademark first 
sale dates back to the late nineteenth century, when 
unprecedented economic change led to a rise in product 
manufacturing and a growing availability of commercial 
goods.40  As a result of these changes, product distribution 
became increasingly sophisticated, adding new layers of 
intermediaries to the traditional channels of product 
marketing.41  To counter trademark owners‘ attempts to 
 
 37. See Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 248 n.2 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (― ‗Genuine‘ goods are goods that are in fact manufactured by the 
same manufacturer that supplies the U.S. trademark holder. . . . [T]hey are the 
genuine article, although they may not have been intended for distribution in 
the U.S. market.‖). 
 38. See, e.g., Vincent N. Palladino, Gray Market Goods: The United States 
Trademark Owners’ View, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 158 (1989) (offering a 
comprehensive survey of the history and case law on parallel imports and 
concluding that these imports cause detriment to trademark owners and 
consumers); see also INTA, supra note 13. 
 39. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 1, at 72 (―[T]hese economic interests are not 
protected by trademark law.  They can only be considered within the framework 
of the law against unfair competition, by contract law, and the law of torts.‖). 
 40. For the evolution of the functions of trademarks, see generally Thomas 
D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks—From Signals 
to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992). 
 41. See, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of 
Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 237 (1983).  ―The industrial revolution 
was characterized by an enormous growth of industry as modern manufacturing 
methods replaced the handwork of older times. . . . Along with the growth of 
distribution came the use of advertising to acquaint the consuming public with 
the availability of the goods.‖  Id. 
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control product distribution after a product (or a batch of 
products) had been introduced into the market, courts on both 
sides of the Atlantic concluded that manufacturers could not 
use trademark rights to bind the buyers of their goods—
retailers and consumers—to their desired terms of 
subsequent sale, for example, by fixing prices for retailers or 
preventing secondary markets for used goods.42  This position 
directly responded to the pressing need to delineate ―a 
necessary demarcation line between two colliding properties: 
the intellectual property right of the producer and the 
common proprietary right of the owner of [the] product he has 
bought.‖43  To avoid extending trademark rights beyond the 
traditional scope of trademark protection—protecting 
consumers and competition in the market—courts and 
trademark theorists agreed that the proprietary owner of a 
product ―should remain free to enjoy the specific privileges of 
traditional ownership: he should be free to resell or otherwise 
dispose of his property.‖ 44 
As mentioned earlier, the acceptance of the principle of 
first sale has rarely been questioned for the unauthorized sale 
of genuine goods originating within national markets.45  
Countries worldwide, however, ―have struggled with the 
question whether [trademark owners] ought to be able to 
block‖ parallel imports of genuine products originating 
outside the national markets.46  In the past, both American 
 
 42. See HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 28–36 (surveying the early decisions in 
this respect in the United States and the United Kingdom); Beier, supra note 1, 
at 49–50 (analyzing the most relevant decisions in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany and the European market, and stressing the role of the Max 
Planck Institute in following the developments on the issue). 
 43. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 18, at 280 (recounting that ―[t]he dogmatic 
explanation of this exhaustion rule . . . has been provided by the patriarch of 
intellectual property law: Josef Kohler‖).  See also HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 29–
30 (commenting on Kohler‘s role in creating the doctrine of universality in 
trademark law). 
 44. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 18, at 280.  Trademark owners, however, 
can still impose distribution and post-sale restrictions with ad hoc contracts and 
specific clauses in licensing agreements.  The instances nonetheless fall outside 
the scope of trademark law and, because of its limited scope, outside the scope of 
this Article. 
 45. See discussion supra Part I. 
 46. HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Kaoru Takamatsu, Parallel 
Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 
433 (1982)).  Parallel importers sell products outside the distribution system 
designed by trademark owners, thus limiting the ability of trademark owners to 
maximize profits by using discriminatory pricing across jurisdictions, which in 
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and European courts have settled this issue by invoking the 
principle of ―common origin‖ of trademarks and trademarked 
products.47  Even if courts accepted the position that the 
nature of trademark rights is ―territorial‖ and not 
―universal‖—i.e., that trademark rights have independent 
existence in separate national jurisdictions48—they allowed 
the importation of gray market products that had been 
distributed in foreign countries when the marks affixed to the 
products belonged to, or were controlled by, the same entities 
inside and outside their jurisdictions (common origin).49  
Courts thus prevented the importation of gray market goods 
as trademark infringement only in two instances: when the 
marks were identical or confusingly similar to pre-existing 
national marks owned by unrelated entities;50 or when 
unauthorized third party importers had altered the quality of 
 
turn could reduce revenues for corporations and, by extension, for the economy 
of their countries.  Id. at 2 (quoting the distributor of PENTAX cameras in the 
United States who complained about gray market goods because ―up to 30% of 
[their] sales were lost to the diverters‖). 
 47. See discussion infra Part III. 
 48. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:1 (―Under the territoriality doctrine, 
a trademark is recognized as having a separate existence in each sovereign 
territory in which it is registered or legally recognized as a mark.‖).  In the 
nineteenth century, several countries instead applied the theory of 
―universality‖ of trademarks, which posits that a mark signifies the same source 
no matter where it is used in the world.  Critically, on the principle of 
territoriality, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching 
Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885 (2004); Timothy 
H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and 
Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 483, 
487–95 (1990); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark 
Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998) (―[T]he territorial model of 
trademark law in such a world is an anachronism and, from a practical 
standpoint, hardly exists in its pure form.‖). 
 49. Hiebert, supra note 48, at 487–95.  Because of its limited scope, this 
Article does not elaborate on the differences between common ownerships, 
subsidiaries, or strategic trademark assignments between parent companies 
and their local subsidiaries in other jurisdictions.  These nuances, however, may 
still be significant under certain national laws with respect to the lawfulness of 
gray market products.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:49.  This Article, 
instead, refers to all marks controlled in some way by the same entities as 
―marks having a common origin‖ and distinguishes these marks from those 
which are owned by separate entities while discussing the application of the 
principle of first sale and the lawfulness of gray market products in the 
particular jurisdictions at issue. 
 50. This does not include, however, the strategic assignment of marks in 
separate jurisdictions to bypass the principle of trademark exhaustion.  Because 
of its limited extent, this Article does not elaborate on the important aspects of 
this issue for parallel imports. 
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the products without the knowledge and the consent of 
trademark owners after the first sale of the products into a 
foreign market by trademark owners.51  To date, several 
countries continue to permit the importation of gray market 
goods manufactured under the same mark and sold in 
different countries by multinational corporations under the 
principle of common origin.52  Still, as this Article elaborates, 
influential corporate interests have increasingly challenged 
this position and have used product diversification across 
separate national markets as an increasingly important 
means to control international trade and prevent the 
importation of gray market goods.53 
B. Trademark Territoriality and Alternative Approaches to 
Trademark First Sale 
Although not unanimously accepted, the modern 
interpretation of trademark rights is based primarily on the 
principle of territoriality.54  An explicit expression of national 
sovereignty, the principle of territoriality of trademark rights 
is at the heart of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (Paris Convention)55 and TRIPS,56 the 
 
 51. See discussion infra Part III. 
 52. For example, Canada, the United States and Mexico still apply the 
principle of international exhaustion of trademark rights.  See infra Part III.A; 
see also CHRISTOPHER HEATH, PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA 1 (2004). 
 53. See, e.g., HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 151; MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 
29:50–51.75. 
 54. Although the same marks are used by the same corporations to identify 
the same products in separate national markets, trademark rights are 
territorial in nature insofar as they are acquired nationally based upon 
requirements set by national laws to identify products within the national 
territory, and enforced nationally based upon national principles of trademark 
infringement and dilution.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:1; Dinwoodie, 
supra note 48, at 887.  Further, trademark disputes are decided nationally by 
national institutions selected according to national laws.  Dinwoodie, supra note 
48, at 887. 
 55. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treatie
s/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf [hereinafter Paris Convention].  The Paris 
Convention was originally enacted in 1883, and subsequently revised in 
Brussels in 1900, Washington in 1911, The Hague in 1925, London in 1934, 
Lisbon in 1958, and Stockholm in 1967.  Id.  Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention 
expressly provides that ―[a] mark duly registered in a country of the [Paris] 
Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in other countries 
of the Union, including the country of origin.‖  Id. art. 6(3).  One hundred 
seventy-three countries worldwide are currently members of the Paris 
Convention.  See Paris Convention Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
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two most relevant international treaties on the 
harmonization of national trademark laws.  Still, nothing in 
the Paris Convention or TRIPS establishes a common position 
for members with respect to trademark exhaustion, and 
national first sale rules remain a choice for each 
jurisdiction.57  In particular, Article 6 of TRIPS states that 
―[f]or the purposes of dispute settlement under this 
Agreement . . . nothing in this Agreement shall be used to 
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights.‖58  According to the Paris Convention and TRIPS, 
however, member countries should prevent, and allow 
trademark owners to object to, the importation into their 
territory of gray market goods that carry marks identical or 
similar to pre-existing and unrelated national trademark 
rights outside the principle of common origin.  Under the 
Paris Convention and TRIPS these occurrences explicitly 
constitute infringement of national trademark rights because 
of the resulting likelihood of confusion for consumers in the 
markets where these goods are imported.59 
In the absence of a mandatory international guideline 
harmonizing national positions on trademark first sale, 
 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lan
g=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 56. TRIPS, supra note 15.  To date, 153 countries are members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).  See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGAN
IZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2011).  Although TRIPS entered into force in 1996, developing 
countries and least-developed countries enjoyed additional transition periods to 
implement TRIPS (which has now been extended until 2013, and until 2016 for 
pharmaceutical patents and undisclosed information). See Understanding the 
WTO: The Agreements; Transition Arrangements: 1, 5 or 11 Years or More, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif
_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 57. In the EU this choice falls with European Institutions.  See discussion 
infra Part. III.B. 
 58. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 6.  On the drafting of Article 6 of TRIPS, see 
Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 508 (noting that this provision represents a 
compromise between two opposite approaches: ―[t]he US Proposal [to introduce 
its own national system,] national exhaustion[,] and the [pleas of] developing 
countries . . . for the opposite,‖ international exhaustion); Stanislaw 
Soltysinsky, International Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights Under the 
TRIPS, the EC Law and the Europe Agreements, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‘L 316, 317–20 
(1996); Verma, supra note 17, at 552–62 (―A review of TRIPS started in 2000 
and it was believed that one issue which may be considered was the question of 
parallel import[ation] and [trademark] exhaustion.‖). 
 59. See Paris Convention, supra note 55, arts. 9, 10, and 10bis; TRIPS, 
supra note 15, art. 16. 
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members of the Paris Convention and TRIPS have thus 
adopted different approaches with respect to the geographical 
extent of their national regimes of trademark exhaustion.60  
As indicated in Part I, these positions are based directly on 
differing national interests regarding free trade and the 
importation of genuine gray market goods into their markets, 
and can be grouped into three categories: national 
exhaustion, international exhaustion, and regional 
exhaustion of trademark rights. 
Undoubtedly the least friendly position with respect to 
free trade, the principle of national exhaustion provides that 
national trademark rights are considered exhausted only 
when a product, or a batch of products, have been distributed 
for sale into the domestic territory by the owner of the mark, 
or with his consent by, for example, an affiliated company, a 
licensee, distributor, or agent.61  Under this principle, 
trademark owners cannot object to the future 
commercialization of those products after their first sale in 
the domestic market unless third parties alter the product 
quality so as to create consumer confusion.62  Trademark 
owners, however, can still oppose the importation into the 
domestic market of genuine goods bearing their trademark (of 
the same or different quality) that have been first distributed 
outside the national territory by trademark owners 
themselves or with their consent.  Likewise, trademark 
owners can object to the reentry of genuine products that 
have been exported outside the domestic market after their 
authorized first sale in the domestic territory.63  Not 
surprisingly, trademark owners have traditionally favored 
this principle versus other categories of trademark 
exhaustion because it affords them the ability to price 
 
 60. See Soltysinsky, supra note 58, at 317–20. 
 61. To date, national exhaustion with respect to trademark rights seem to 
be a less frequent choice among WTO members, even though most members 
practice national exhaustion with respect to patents and copyrights.  See INTA, 
supra note 13, at 5.  National trademark exhaustion is nonetheless the principle 
favored by multinational corporations and the INTA because it is the most 
favorable toward trademark owners.  See id. 
 62. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 63. See generally Rasmussen, supra note 20, at 174 (describing the effects of 
the different types of trademark exhaustion). 
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differentiate and control product distribution across different 
jurisdictions.64 
More favorable toward free trade, the principle of 
international exhaustion states instead that national 
trademark rights are considered exhausted after a product, or 
a batch of products, have been distributed for sale by the 
owner of the mark or with her consent anywhere in the 
world.65  In countries adopting international exhaustion, 
trademark owners cannot object to the importation of gray 
market goods carrying their marks that were first marketed 
outside the national market or the reentry of genuine goods 
that were exported abroad after their first domestic sale.66  
Trademark owners, however, are still free to oppose the 
importation of products that have been altered without their 
consent; this is intended to protect consumers against 
confusion, and to protect the reputation of the trademark 
owners.67  In some of the jurisdictions applying international 
exhaustion, trademark owners can object also to the 
importation of gray market products that, although genuine, 
are of materially different quality than the products 
distributed under authorization by trademark owners in the 
national market.68  Theoretically, this objection is justified 
because these differences in quality could lead to consumer 
confusion.  As indicated earlier, however, these differences 
are often the result of corporate strategies and are directly 
intended to prevent parallel trade and control international 
product distribution.69 
Lastly, as a hybrid solution between national and 
international exhaustion for countries desiring to promote 
free trade, but mainly at a regional (rather than worldwide) 
level, a third type of trademark exhaustion has emerged in 
the past half century—regional exhaustion.  Under this 
principle, national trademark rights granted by each member 
of a regional agreement are exhausted after the trademark 
owner places a product, or a batch of products, on the market 
 
 64. INTA, supra note 13, at 5. 
 65. See, e.g., Verma, supra note 17, at 539. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 16 (providing the general principle 
against trademark infringement that member countries have to follow); Paris 
Convention, supra note 55, arts. 9, 10, and 10bis (same). 
 68. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 69. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B. 
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in any of the national territories of the members of the 
agreement.70  Under this regime, trademark owners cannot 
object to the further circulation of their products within the 
boundaries of the regional agreement regardless of which 
country the first sale of the products occurred within the 
region.71  Trademark owners, however, may still oppose the 
importation of gray market products that have been 
introduced into the market outside the national territory of 
the members of the regional agreement as well as the reentry 
of products that have left the regional market to be exported 
outside the territory of the members of the regional 
agreement.72  As elaborated below, to date, the most notable 
example of a regional integration adopting the principle of 
regional exhaustion of trademark rights is the European 
Union.73 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK FIRST SALE IN NORTH 
AMERICA AND EUROPE 
This Section examines the positions taken with respect to 
the principle of trademark first sale and the importation of 
materially different gray market products by the members of 
NAFTA and the EU, respectively.  Both NAFTA and the EU 
seek to create free trade areas, but differ considerably in the 
level of integration achieved among their members.  First, 
this Section introduces NAFTA and illustrates the national 
regimes on trademark exhaustion adopted by Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico.  Second, this Section describes the 
creation of the European internal market and the adoption of 
the principle of regional exhaustion to promote free trade in 
the EU. 
A. NAFTA and the Laissez Faire Approach to National First 
Sale Rules 
The adoption of NAFTA in 1994 marked the creation of a 
free trade area covering Canada, the United States, and 
 
 70. See Rasmussen, supra note 20, at 174. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See discussion infra Part III.B for the cases decided by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ), clarifying that trademark owners in the 
EU can not prevent the parallel trade within the European market but can 
oppose the importation of gray market products coming from outside the EU. 
 73. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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Mexico,74 the purpose of which was, in principle, to eliminate 
all barriers to trade and facilitate free movement of goods 
across member countries.75  Adopted two years prior to the 
implementation of TRIPS, NAFTA was also the first 
international trade agreement to impose detailed obligations 
on its members to protect intellectual property rights.76  
Specifically, Article 1701 of NAFTA requires that member 
countries provide ―adequate and effective protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights‖ in each Party‘s 
territory;77 these measures, however, should not ―become 
barriers to legitimate trade.‖78  According to Article 1704, 
NAFTA members can also specify licensing practices or 
conditions in their domestic law that may have an adverse 
effect on market competition and they can also adopt 
measures to prevent and control these practices or conditions 
subject to the general principles of the agreement.79 
Despite this commitment to promote free trade and 
integrate the markets of member countries, NAFTA does not 
address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights, 
including trademark exhaustion.80  Instead, similar to TRIPS, 
NAFTA leaves member countries free to adopt their preferred 
position with respect to the geographical extent of their 
national rules on trademark first sale and the importation of 
gray market goods into their territories.81  In the absence of 
any guidance or harmonization in this area, NAFTA members 
 
 74. NAFTA, supra note 19. 
 75. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 102.  ―The objectives of this Agreement . . . 
are to . . . eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border 
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties, . . . 
promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area . . . .‖  Id.  See also 
discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 76. NAFTA, supra note 19, Ch. 17.  Most likely as a result of the ongoing 
TRIPS negotiation at the time of the adoption of NAFTA, NAFTA provisions are 
largely modeled after TRIPS.  See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 14, at 791. 
 77. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1701(1). 
 78. Id.  See also, e.g., George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the Legal 
Implications of the Intellectual Property Provisions of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 305, 306 (1993) (discussing NAFTA 
treatment of intellectual property rights). 
 79. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1704. 
 80. See Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 308 (noting the lack of common rules on 
the issue of parallel imports among NAFTA members). 
 81. Id.  See also Theodore H. Davis Jr., Territoriality and Exhaustion of 
Trademark Rights Under the Laws of the North Atlantic Nations, 89 
TRADEMARK REP. 657 (1999) (describing the approach adopted by Canada and 
the United States with respect to parallel imports). 
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thus continue to adopt their pre-NAFTA national policies.  
Nevertheless, even without an ad hoc harmonization of 
national rules, NAFTA members adopt consistent national 
positions with respect to trademark first sale and the 
importation of genuine but materially different goods into 
their territories.  Notably, NAFTA members individually 
practice the principle of international trademark exhaustion 
within their respective territories and allow, although with 
some variations, the importation of materially different gray 
market goods from other NAFTA members as well as from 
other foreign jurisdictions. 
International exhaustion of trademark rights has been 
the general rule in Canada since the late 1880s.82  Canadian 
law has long established that once products have entered the 
stream of trade anywhere in the world, their importation into 
the national territory is permitted and does not constitute 
trademark infringement when the same or affiliated owners 
control the marks both inside and outside Canada (common 
origin marks).83  Based upon the general principles of 
trademark protection, Canadian law only prohibits as 
trademark infringement the importation of products bearing 
marks identical or similar to marks already in use in the 
national territory when these marks are not owned or 
controlled by the same entity and the importation of those 
goods could create consumer confusion.84  Still, Canadian 
 
 82. Condy v. Taylor (1887), 56 L.T.R. 891 (Ch.) (stating that no trademark 
infringement occurs when the goods are genuine goods manufactured by 
trademark owners). 
 83. See Wilkinson Sword (Can.) Ltd. v. Juda (1966), 51 C.P.R. 55 (Can.); 
Wella Canada Inc. v. Pearlon Products Ltd. (1984), 4 C.P.R. 3d 287 (Can. Ont. 
H.C.J.); Coca-Cola Ltd. v. Pardham, (1999) 85 C.P.R. 3d 489 (Can. F.C.A.).  For 
further analysis, see Davis, supra note 81, at 721–30. 
 84. See Consumers Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd. (1984), 1 
C.P.R. 3d 1, 13–14 (Can. S.C.C.).  This decision was codified in the Canadian 
Trade-marks Act of 1985, SC 1952-53, c. 49, as amended, RSC 1985, c. T-10 
(Can).  Section 7(b) provides that ―[n]o person shall . . . direct public attention to 
his wares, services or business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause 
confusion in Canada . . . between his wares, services or business and the wares, 
services and business of another.‖  Canadian Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
T-13 § 7(b).  Section 19 states that a national registration ―gives to the owner of 
the trade-mark the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada of the trade-
mark in respect of those wares or services.‖  Id. § 19.  Section 20 provides that 
―[t]he right of the owner of a registered trade-mark to its exclusive use shall be 
deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its use under this Act who 
sells, distributes or advertises wares or services in association with a confusing 
trade-mark or trade-name . . . .‖  Id. § 20. 
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courts have occasionally objected to the importation of gray 
market goods carrying common origin marks when these 
goods were materially different from the products authorized 
in the Canadian market and when these differences could 
harm consumers or the public good.85  For example, Canadian 
courts have prevented the importation of genuine gray 
market goods because the goods had been damaged and the 
distributor had replaced the labels that were originally 
removed by trademark owners.86  Canadian courts have also 
prevented the importation of gray market goods because the 
formulation of those goods was different than the products 
sold nationally and could cause consumer confusion.87  
Canadian courts have also carefully scrutinized the 
importation of products that required compliance with 
technical standards and only allowed their sale if importers 
disclosed to the public any differences with respect to product 
standards.88  Generally, however, Canadian courts have been 
―relatively sympathetic‖ toward unauthorized parallel 
importers and rarely prohibit the importation of gray market 
goods into Canada when the importers use labels to cure the 
risk of a likelihood of consumer confusion because of products‘ 
material differences after the products have been distributed 
into the national territory.89 
 
 85. In this respect, the position of Canadian courts has been defined as 
―inconsistent.‖  Davis, supra note 81, at 730.  ―The significance of material 
differences in goods sought to be imported to the exhaustion of trademark rights 
has been the subject of inconsistent decisions under Canadian law.‖  Id.  
Compare Mattel Canada Inc. v. GTS Acquisitions Ltd. (1989), 27 C.P.R. 3d 358 
(Can. F.C.A.), with Smith & Nephew  Inc. v. Glen Oak Inc. (1996), 68 CPR 3d 
153 (Can. F.C.A.).  Compare also Consumers Distributing, 1 C.P.R. 3d 1, with 
Sharp Electronic of Canada Ltd. v. Continental Electronic Info. Inc. (1988), 23 
C.P.R. 3d 330 (Can. B.C.S.C.). 
 86. Dupont of Canada Ltd. v. Nomad Trading Co. (1968), 55 C.P.R. 97 (Can. 
Que. S.C.). 
 87. See H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Edan Foods Sales Inc. (1991), 35 
C.P.R. 3d 213 (Can. F.C.T.D.) (finding potential consumer confusion between 
the formulation of ketchup in Canada and the United States because of the 
different tomatoes used in the respective products). 
 88. Consumers Distributing, 1 C.P.R. 3d 1.  But see Sharp Electronic, 23 
C.P.R. 3d 330 (enjoining the further importation of facsimile machines because 
the goods were ―inherently different in quality‖ from those sold by the plaintiff 
in Canada).  
 89. Davis, supra note 81, at 732.  Consumers Distributing, 1 C.P.R. 3d, at 
24–25 (noting that the notice affixed to the products neutralized the significance 
of any difference in the products‘ warranties).  See also Nestle Enterprises Ltd. 
v. Edan Sales Inc. (1991), 37 C.P.R. 3d 480 (Can. F.C.A.) (stating that ―[t]he 
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Similar to Canada, the United States has also 
traditionally followed a system of international exhaustion,90 
and has prevented parallel imports only for products that 
carry marks identical or similar to marks already in use in 
the United States by third parties.91  U.S. law explicitly 
allows parallel imports of gray market goods when ―both the 
foreign and the U.S. trademark are owned by the same 
person or business entity‖ or the owners of these marks are 
―parent and subsidiary companies or otherwise subjected to 
common ownership and control.‖92  Similar to Canada, U.S. 
courts nonetheless have allowed trademark owners to prevent 
the importation of gray market products when they ―differ 
materially‖ from the goods authorized for sale in the domestic 
market even if the marks share a common ownership or 
control inside and outside the United States.93  This rule was 
 
evidence does not satisfy . . . that Mountain Blend is an ‗inferior‘ product.  It is 
simply different from the plaintiff‘s pure coffee blends and that difference is 
adequately stated on the label.‖). 
 90. Originally, U.S. courts allowed parallel imports based on the principle of 
―universality‖ of trademark rights.  See Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Steger, 285 F. 
861 (2d Cir. 1922); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 
1916); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.N.Y. 1886).  In A. Bourjois & Co. 
v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), the Supreme 
Court affirmed that marks have separate existence in separate national 
territories.  See also American Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers Inc., 
406 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that in Katzel the Supreme Court ―marked 
a dramatic change in trademark law by adopting the principle of ‗territoriality‘ 
of trademarks and moving away from the rule of ‗universality‘ ‖); HIEBERT, 
supra note 1, at 103. 
 91. The U.S. Tariff Act prohibits the importation of a product ―that bears a 
trademark owned by a citizen of . . . the United States and is registered in the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.‖  See Tariff Act of 1930 § 526(a), 19 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1526(a) (2006).  The Lanham Act bars the importation of goods with a mark 
that will ―copy or simulate‖ a registered trademark.  Lanham Act § 42, 15 
U.S.C. § 1124 (2006).  The Lanham Act also applies the traditional provisions 
against infringement to confusingly similar products.  Lanham Act §§ 32(a) 
(registered marks), 43(b) (unregistered marks), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a), 1125(b). 
 92. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 289 (1988) (indicating that 
the ―extraordinary protection‖ afforded by the Tariff Act § 526 is exclusively for 
domestic U.S. trademark owners that have no corporate affiliation with the 
foreign manufacturer).  For further analysis on this principle and other judicial 
references on the point, see MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:49. 
 93. This principle follows two decisions of the D.C. Circuit: Lever Bros. Co. 
v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989) and Lever Bros. Co. v. United 
States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  The court confirmed that when a mark 
is applied to physically different goods, the mark is not ―genuine‖ for the 
American consumer and the affiliation between the producers does not reduce 
the confusion that could result from those differences.  Lever Bros., 877 F.2d 
101; Lever Bros., 981 F.2d 1330. 
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adopted in the Lever Brothers cases to avoid the potential 
confusion that could otherwise be created for consumers if 
two seemingly identical products are sold in the U.S. market 
under the same marks but have different material 
characteristics.94  As an exception to the Lever Brothers rule, 
however, the U.S. Customs Service Regulations provide that 
materially different products can still lawfully enter into the 
U.S. territory when importers properly label those goods with 
a notice stating: ―This product is not authorized by the United 
States trademark owner for importation and is materially 
different from the authorized products.‖95  As a result, as long 
as products are properly labeled according to the U.S. 
Customs Regulations, trademark owners cannot rely on the 
Lever Brothers rule (and on material product differences) to 
prevent the importation of otherwise genuine products into 
the U.S. market.  In other words, under U.S. Customs Service 
Regulations, proper labeling can guarantee that marks 
continue to serve the traditional trademark functions—
indicating to consumers that the marked products are the 
same goods, in terms of commercial origin and quality, which 
were first distributed in the market by trademark owners.96 
Finally, like Canada and the United States, Mexico also 
adopts a system of international trademark first sale as a 
domestic policy.97  According to Article 92(II) of the Mexican 
 
 94. Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 103; Lever Bros., 981 F.2d at 1331.  See also 
Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 639 (1st 
Cir. 1992) (stating that ―under section 42, as under section 32, the question of 
whether [defendant] infringed the PERUGINA mark hinges on whether 
physical or like material differences exist between the Italian-made and 
Venezuelan-made products‖).  For a detailed survey of the relevant U.S. cases, 
see MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50–51.75. 
 95. 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b).  ―Goods determined by the Customs Service to be 
physically and materially different . . . shall not be detained . . . where the 
merchandise or its packaging bears a conspicuous and legible label designed to 
remain on the product until the first point of sale . . . .‖  Id.  ―The label must be 
in close proximity to the trademark as it appears in its most prominent location 
on the article itself or the retail package or container.  Other information 
designed to dispel consumer confusion may also be added.‖  Id.  See also 
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50; Mark S. Sommers & Louis J. Levy, US 
Customs Amends Gray Market Import Rule, 117 TRADEMARK WORLD 32, 33 
(1999). 
 96. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50. 
 97. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 305–06 (analyzing the 
phenomenon of parallel imports in the NAFTA context with particular attention 
to Mexico); Bill F. Kryzda & Shaun F. Downey, Overview of Recent Changes in 
Mexican Industrial Property Law and the Enforcement of Rights by the Relevant 
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Industrial Property Law,98 the registration of a mark cannot 
be used against ―any person who markets, distributes, 
acquires or uses the product to which the trademark is 
applied for after the said product has been lawfully 
introduced on the market by the owner of the registered mark 
or his licensee.‖99  Specifically, ―[t]his case shall include the 
import of legitimate products to which the registered mark is 
applied, carried out by any person for their use, distribution 
or marketing in Mexico . . . .‖100  Gray market products are 
considered ―legitimate‖ under the Mexican Industrial 
Property Law Regulations provided that they are introduced 
into the market of the country from which they are imported 
by the ―owner or licensee of the registered mark‖ and that the 
owner of the mark inside and outside Mexico are ―the same 
person or members of the same joint economic interest group, 
or their licensees or sublicensees.‖101  Similar to Canada and 
the United States, however, Mexican law prohibits as 
trademark infringement the circulation of marked products 
when their quality has been altered by unauthorized third 
party importers,102 or when the mark has been altered or 
removed altogether.103  Still, the Mexican Industrial Property 
Regulations do not prevent the importation of materially 
 
Government Authorities, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 99, 101 (1995) (considering the 
changes to the Mexican Industrial Property Law in 1994 as a result of Mexico‘s 
signing of NAFTA). 
 98. Ley de Fomento y Protección de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. 4, June 
27, 1991, amended by D.O. Aug. 2, 1994 (Mex.), available at http://www.wipo.int
/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128816 [hereinafter Mexican Industrial Property 
Law]. 
 99. Id. art. 92(II). 
 100. Id.  This provision is applicable ―pursuant to the terms and conditions 
laid down in the Regulations under this law.‖  Id. 
 101. Article 54 of the Mexican Industrial Property Regulations provides that:  
it shall be presumed . . . that imported goods are legitimate where they 
meet the following requirements:  
I. the introduction of the goods to the market of the country from 
which importation takes place must be done by the person who in 
that country is the owner or licensee of the registered mark;  
II. the owners of the mark registered in Mexico and in the foreign 
country must, on the date on which the importation of the goods 
takes place, be the same person or members of the same joint 
economic interest group, or their licensees or sub licensees. 
Reglamento de la Ley de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. Nov. 23, 1994 (Mex.), art. 
54, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/mx/mx002en.pdf 
[hereinafter Mexican Industrial Property Regulations]. 
 102. Mexican Industrial Property Law, supra note 98, art. 213(XX). 
 103. Id. art. 213(XXI). 
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different genuine gray market goods and do not require 
special labeling for those goods to be admitted and lawfully 
circulate in the Mexican territory.104  Moreover, to date, 
Mexican courts do not seem to have halted or expressed 
concern as to the importation of materially different gray 
market goods into Mexico because of potential consumer 
confusion.105 
B. The Harmonization of National First Sale Rules in 
European Trademark Law 
Since the original signing of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC or Community) in 
1957, the primary objective of the members of the EEC (now 
the EU) was the creation of an integrated European market 
where goods, services, people, and capital could move without 
restrictions.106  Since then, the European Parliament, the 
European Commission (EC), and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) have carefully balanced the protection 
of intellectual property rights among member countries with 
the primary objective of promoting the free movement of 
goods in the European market.107  As I have illustrated in a 
previous work, this has resulted in the development of a 
system of region-wide exhaustion where intellectual property 
 
 104. Mexican Industrial Property Regulations, supra note 101, art. 54.  The 
Mexican Industrial Property Regulations are also silent as to the case of 
imports concerning repackaged or relabeled goods.  Id. 
 105. Although courts have not considered the repackaging or relabeling of 
gray market products, these instances could likely fall under the prohibition of 
Article 213 of the Mexican Industrial Property Law.  Mexican Industrial 
Property Law, supra note 98, art. 213(XX and XXI). 
 106. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) [hereinafter TFEU] as amended 
following the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009. 
Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306).  A complete list of the various 
amendments to the original Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (now European Union) is available 
at http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/ index_en.htm. 
 107. On the historical tension between the protection of intellectual property 
and the free movement of goods in the EU, see Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial 
Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market, 21 
I.I.C. 131 (1990) [hereinafter Beier, Industrial Property]; Friedrich-Karl Beier, 
The Doctrine of Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law—Scope and Limits, 10 
I.I.C. 20 (1979); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising Intellectual Property 
Law Within the European Community, 23 I.I.C. 622 (1992); Ulrich Löwenheim, 
Trademarks and European Community Law, 9 I.I.C. 422 (1978); Willem Mak, 
Trademarks and the European Common Market, 6 I.I.C. 29 (1975). 
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rights, including trademark rights, are exhausted with 
respect to the territory of the EU after the first sale of a 
product, or a batch of products, in the EU; thereafter, those 
products can freely circulate within the European market.108  
As detailed below, the ECJ first adopted this principle as a 
measure to foster intra-Community trade leaving member 
countries free to adopt a broader regime, i.e., international 
exhaustion, in their national territory.  As the European 
market integration intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Community-wide exhaustion has become the general rule for 
all EU members.109 
The adoption of the Community-wide exhaustion of 
trademark rights traces back to the 1960s.  Originally, the 
ECJ turned to the antitrust provisions of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to rule that 
attempts to block the free movement of goods across member 
countries were ―incompatible with the common market.‖110  
Starting in the 1970s, the constant tension between the 
exercise of intellectual property rights and gray market goods 
within the EU prompted the ECJ to rely on the principle of 
free movement of goods, as settled in Articles 34 and 36 of the 
TFEU, in order to effectively integrate the European internal 
market.  Article 34 prohibits quantitative restrictions on 
importation between ―Member States‖ and other measures 
having an ―equivalent effect,‖111 whereas Article 36 states 
 
 108. This paragraph summarizes my previous detailed analysis of the 
principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU.  See Calboli, supra note 2, at 47, 
5359.  The creation of the European internal market imposed the acceptance of 
the principle of Community-wide exhaustion also with respect to patents and 
copyrights.  This position is different from other jurisdictions, which practice 
international exhaustion with respect to trademarks, but national exhaustion 
with respect to patents and copyrights. 
 109. Id. at 5360 (reconstructing the development of the principle of 
Community-wide exhaustion and the debates over the application of this 
principle as general standard among EU members).  See also the ECJ position 
in Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998). 
 110. Articles 101 and 102 (formerly 81 and 82) are the antitrust provisions of 
the TFEU.  See TFEU, supra note 106, arts. 101–102.  The ECJ applied these 
provisions in Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Costen & Grunding v. EC Comm‘n, 1966 
E.C.R. 299; Case 24/67, Parke Davis v. Centrafarm, 1968 E.C.R. 55; Case 40/70, 
Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69. 
 111. Article 34 (formerly 28) of the TFEU states that ―[q]uantitative 
restriction on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States.‖  TFEU, supra note 106, art. 34. 
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that domestic laws should not provide a means of ―arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction of trade between 
Member States.‖112  In several decisions, the ECJ stated that 
the primary purpose of trademark protection is to indicate 
commercial origin and that no reason subsists to prevent the 
free movement of goods carrying marks controlled by the 
same companies.113  According to the ECJ, only when marks 
do not share a common origin would it be possible to prevent 
the importation of gray market products bearing identical or 
similar marks in a member country to prevent consumer 
confusion.114 
While affirming the legitimacy of parallel imports of gray 
market goods within the European internal market, the ECJ 
conceded, however, the possibility of preventing the 
importation of products, which have been altered without 
trademark owners‘ consent.115  The ECJ nonetheless limited 
 
 112. Id. art. 36.  Article 36 (formerly 30) states that EU members can 
prohibit or restrict ―imports, exports or goods in transit‖ based upon ―public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing 
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and 
commercial property.‖  Id.  These prohibitions ―shall not, however, constitute a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States.‖  Id. 
 113. In Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
Grossmarket GmbH, 1971 E.C.R. 487, the ECJ distinguished between the 
―existence‖ and the ―exercise‖ of intellectual property rights and stated that the 
―exercise‖ should be consistent with the TFEU and protect only the ―specific 
subject matter‖ of the right.  The ECJ clarified the interpretation of ―specific 
subject matter‖ in Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 
1183, 1194 and confirmed its view in Case 3/78, Centrafarm BV v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., 1978 E.C.R. 183 and Case 1/81, Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm 
GmbH, 1981 E.C.R. 2913.  For further analysis, see Calboli, supra note 2, at 54–
56. 
 114. On the principle of ―common origin,‖ see Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres 
v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731 (controversially stating that common origin 
included the case of companies ―sharing the same origin‖ even if the marks were 
not owned by the same entities); Case 119/75, Terrapin Ltd. v. Terranova 
Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., 1976 E.C.R. 1039 (stating that the ―common 
origin‖ doctrine was applied to a special case in Hag I); Case C-10/89, CNL-
Sucal v. Hag AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711 (reversing the ECJ‘s position in Hag I); 
Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH 
1994 E.C.R. I-2782 (holding that the principle of ―common origin‖ does not apply 
when marks have been voluntarily assigned).  For further analysis on this 
point, see Calboli, supra note 2, at 56–59. 
 115. See Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm 
Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, 
1164–65; see also Ansgar Only, Trade Marks and Parallel Importation—Recent 
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these instances to circumstances where products had been 
materially altered by the importers—for example, repackaged 
or relabeled—after their first sale in the market and not to 
cases where the products were genuine (originally 
manufactured), and the product quality was materially 
different only because of production choices or market 
differentiation strategies directly originating with trademark 
owners.116  Moreover, the ECJ developed the principle of 
―mutual recognition‖ of product requirements to prevent 
product discrimination and disguised restrictions to trade, 
and ruled that member countries may not ―prohibit the sale 
in [their] territory of a product lawfully produced and 
marketed in another Member . . . even if the product is 
produced according to technical or quality requirements 
which differ from those imposed on its domestic products.‖117  
As a result of this principle, differences in product 
ingredients, presentation, or even technical standards would 
not qualify as a legitimate reason to prevent parallel imports 
and restrict free trade within the European market except in 
very limited and specific circumstances.118  To prevent 
disguised barriers to intra-Community trade, European 
legislators also harmonized an increasing number of technical 
standards.  In 1985, to address the growing need for standard 
harmonization, the European Council adopted the ―New 
Approach to technical harmonization and standards‖119 and 
 
Developments in European Law, 30 I.I.C. 521, 516 (1999) (providing a detailed 
survey of the cases where genuine products have been repackaged, rebranded, 
and relabeled). 
 116. Only, supra note 115, at 516–18. 
 117. Commission Communication, Oct. 3, 1980, Communication from the 
Commission concerning the consequences of the judgment given by the Court of 
Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (‗Cassis de Dijon‘), 1980 O.J. (C 
256) 2, 2–3.  The ECJ developed the principle of ―mutual recognition‖ in the 
famous case Cassis de Dijon.  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.  In Cassis de 
Dijon, the ECJ stated that there was no valid reason why ―provided that [the 
goods] have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, 
[they] should not be introduced into any other Member State.‖  Id. at para. 14. 
 118. In Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ limited those instances to the measures 
―being necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions and the defense of the consumer.‖  Rewe-Zentral, 1979 
E.C.R. 649.  See also TFEU, supra note 106, art. 36. 
 119. Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical 
harmonization and standards, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1. 
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stated that EU legislators had to indicate simply the 
―essential requirements‖ for products, leaving it to 
independent European Standards Organizations to develop 
technical standards complying with these essential 
requirements.120 
The principle of Community-wide exhaustion of 
trademark rights was ultimately codified in the First Council 
Directive 89/104/EEC (Trademark Directive),121 and repeated 
verbatim in the Council Regulation EC/40/94 (Community 
Trademark Regulation).122  The adoption of the Agreement for 
the European Economic Area (EEA) of May 2, 1992, extended 
this principle to the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) 
countries joining the EEA (Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein).123  Notably, Article 7(1) of the Directive states 
that trademark rights ―shall not entitle the proprietor to 
prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on 
the market in the Community under that trade mark by the 
proprietor or with his consent.‖124  Article 7(1) does not 
explicitly say, however, that Community-wide exhaustion is 
the only principle applicable within the EU (and now within 
the EEA).125  In the years following the adoption of the 
Directive, member countries in favor of international 
exhaustion argued that this principle was simply a minimum 
 
 120. For a detailed summary of the process of harmonization of technical 
standards and the ―New Approach to technical harmonization and standards,‖ 
see Enterprise Directorate General, Vademecum on European Standardisation, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004) available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/polici
es/european-standards/documents/vademecum/index_en.htm. 
 121. Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EEC), now replaced by 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/95, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 (EC) 
[hereinafter Trademark Directive].  For a detailed analysis of the legislative 
history of the Trademark Directive and the drafting process of Article 7 on the 
exhaustion of trademark rights, see Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 501. 
 122. Council Regulation 40/94, Dec. 20, 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 
1994 O.J. (L 011) 1 (EC), now replaced by Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 
O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC) [hereinafter CTM Regulation].  Article 13(1) of the CTM 
Regulation states that ―[a] Community trade mark shall not entitle the 
proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the 
market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his 
consent.‖  Id. art. 13. 
 123. Annex XVII and Article 2(1) of the Protocol to the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994, O.J. (L 1) 3 extended the effect of Article 
7 of the Trademark Directive to the EEA from January 1, 1994. 
 124. Trademark Directive, supra note 121, art. 7(1). 
 125. See, e.g., Nicholas Shea, Does the First Trade Marks Directive Allow 
International Exhaustion of Rights?, 10 E.I.P.R. 463, 463 (1995). 
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standard and that individual members of the EU were free to 
apply a broader rule.126  Against this position, however, the 
ECJ clarified that EEA-wide exhaustion is the only applicable 
criterion within the European market and that national rules 
providing different exhaustion regimes needed to be 
amended.127 
Finally, Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive states 
that trademark rights are not exhausted where ―there exist 
legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further 
commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition 
of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put 
on the market.‖128  Although the ECJ has confirmed the 
possibility that ―legitimate reasons‖ may prevent trademark 
exhaustion and the free movement of goods within the EEA, 
the ECJ has nonetheless interpreted this provision cautiously 
to prevent unnecessary trade restrictions.  Specifically, the 
ECJ held that the unauthorized repackaging and relabeling 
of genuine products constitute two of the few ―legitimate 
reasons‖ that trademark owners may invoke to prevent 
parallel trade within the EEA because they may lead to 
consumer confusion or provoke unfair detriment to the 
reputation of a mark.129  The ECJ also clarified that the 
 
 126. This position was strongly supported, among others, by Professor F. K. 
Beier, the Director of the Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition, and Tax Law.  See Beier, Industrial Property, supra note 107, at 
156–60.  For a detailed reconstruction of the debates on this issue following the 
adoption of the Trademark Directive, see Calboli, supra note 2, at 60–66. 
 127. See Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998).  In Silhouette, the ECJ explicitly 
stated that ―[n]ational rules providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in 
respect of products put on the market outside the EEA under that mark by the 
proprietor or with its consent are contrary to Article 7(1).‖  Id. at para 31.  The 
ECJ confirmed this position in C-173/98, Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison 
Dubois et Fils AS v. GB-Unic SA, (1999) C.M.L.R. 1317; Joined Cases C-414-
416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Tesco 
Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK Ltd., 2001 E.C.R. I-
8691; C-324/08, Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel CV, Metro Cash & Carry BV, 
Remo Zaandam BV v. Diesel SpA, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019.  But see Case C-306/96, 
Javico Int‘l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983 
(where the ECJ adopted a different position based upon the antitrust provisions 
of the TFEU); Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co., 29 I.I.C. 316 
(EFTA 1998) (where the EFTA court stressed that courts or legislators in EFTA 
States should decide on the admissibility of products imported from outside the 
EEA). 
 128. Trademark Directive, supra note 121, art. 7(2). 
 129. See Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. 
Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, I-3536–45; Case C-379/97, Pharmacia & 
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exceptions of Article 7(2) do not extend to genuine goods of 
materially different quality when these differences are the 
result of trademark owners‘ marketing strategies and the 
unauthorized importers have not modified the products.130  
Likewise, the principle of mutual recognition continues to 
apply in the EU (EEA), and EU (EEA) members cannot 
prevent the importation of materially different goods from 
other members when those products comply with the 
requirements of the exporting countries.131  Moreover, a ―New 
Legislative Framework‖ has replaced the ―New Approach to 
technical harmonization‖ and requires that EU (EEA) 
members take on an even larger role in increasing compliance 
with European standards to promote product uniformity and 
intra-EEA trade.132 
IV. LESSONS FROM A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NORTH 
AMERICA AND EUROPE 
This Section compares the positions adopted by NAFTA 
 
Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, 1999 E.C.R. I-6927; Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. 
Ballantine & Son Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6227; Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian 
Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013; Case C-143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim 
KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-3759; Case C-348/04, Boehringer 
Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-03391; Case C- 276/05, 
Wellcome Found. Ltd. v. Paranova Parmazeutika Handels GmbH, 2008 E.C.R. 
I-10479; see also Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans, International 
Exhaustion in the European Union in the Light of “Zino Davidoff”: Contract 
Versus Trade Mark Law?, 31 I.I.C. 123, 137–38 (2000); Paul Torremans, New 
Repackaging Under the Trade Mark Directive of Well-established Exhaustion 
Principles, 11 E.I.P.R. 664 (1997). But see Case C-59/08, Copad SA v. Christian 
Dior Couture SA and Others, 2009 E.C.R. I-3421; Case C-558/08, Portakabin 
Ltd., Portakabin BV v. Primakabin BV, 2010 E.C.R. I-0000; Case C-127/09, Coty 
Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v. Simex Trading AG, 2010 E.C.R. I-0000. 
 130. In Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. I-6227, the ECJ also said that importers 
could remove labels when these labels had been placed by trademark owners 
simply to control distribution and prevent parallel imports.  In Parfums 
Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, the ECJ went even further and applied 
trademark exhaustion to the use of trademarks in advertising. More recently, 
however, in Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-3421 the ECJ stated that a trademark owner 
may oppose the unauthorized sale of luxury goods to discount stores by a 
licensee if the sale could damages the reputation of the mark. 
 131. See Council Resolution of 28 October 1999 on mutual recognition, 2000 
O.J. (C 141) 2 (incorporated into the EEA Agreement); see Decision of the EEA 
Joint Committee No. 15/2002 of 1 March 2002 amending Annex II (technical 
regulations, standards, testing, and certifications) to the EEA Agreement, 2002 
O.J. (L 110) 9. 
 132. European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 765/2008 of 9 
July 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 218) 30. 
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and EU (EEA) members, and emphasizes the limitations of 
the principle of trademark first sale to guarantee free trade in 
free trade areas.  In particular, this Section argues that 
effective free trade in free trade areas requires the adoption 
of a cumulative approach that combines uniform first sale 
rules, of at least regional exhaustion, with the prohibition 
against preventing the importation of materially different 
gray market products. This Section concludes that, in the 
long term, this can be achieved by the international 
harmonization of national product standards.  In the 
immediate future, however, members of free trade areas can 
admit materially different gray market goods based on one of 
the following approaches: (1) mutually recognize national 
product characteristics of other members of free trade areas, 
or (2) allow the importation of materially different goods, so 
long as those products are properly labeled to avoid consumer 
confusion. 
A. Trademark First Sale and Market Integration in North 
America and Europe 
As elaborated in Part II, the general purpose of the 
principle of trademark first sale is to prevent the use of 
marks as a tool for market segmentation and to promote the 
free movement of goods in the market.133  The application of 
this principle across multiple jurisdictions, however, has 
created heated debate because of the impact of parallel 
imports on corporate profits and, in turn, national 
economies.134  Still, countries have intensely pursued 
international free trade agreements in the past few decades 
because of their advantages for both corporations and 
national economies.135  Hence, effective free trade can be 
secured only by limiting, inter alia, the domestic enforcement 
of national trademark rights when this enforcement can 
represent a barrier to legitimate trade.136 
The above described approaches by NAFTA and EU 
(EEA) members regarding the admissibility of gray market 
 
 133. See discussion supra Part II. 
 134. See discussion supra Part I. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See generally ABBOT ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (introducing the relevance 
of international intellectual property in an increasingly integrated world 
economy). 
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goods in their territory directly reflect this tension between 
free trade and the exercise of trademark rights.137  NAFTA 
and EU (EEA) members, however, have followed different 
models when pursuing the creation of their respective free 
trade areas.138  Similar to TRIPS, NAFTA members have 
adopted primarily a laissez faire approach to domestic 
trademark first sale rules based on a strict interpretation of 
the principle of trademark territoriality and national 
sovereignty.139  In contrast, EU (EEA) members have 
partially relinquished national sovereignty on the matter, 
and have harmonized their national laws to create a unified 
European market where the free movement of goods is a 
fundamental priority.140 
Still, despite the fact that the harmonization of domestic 
rules on trademark first sale never constituted a national 
priority among NAFTA members,141 all members of NAFTA 
individually practice international trademark exhaustion and 
permit the importation, and the circulation, of gray market 
goods within their respective territory when the marks 
affixed to the products share a common origin inside and 
outside their jurisdictions.142  As a result, NAFTA members 
de facto promote the free movement of goods across the 
NAFTA territory.143  NAFTA does not create, however, a fully 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. See discussion supra Part III. 
 139. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an 
Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT‘L L. 505, 549 n.223 (1997) (highlighting that 
NAFTA members only agreed upon the fact that NAFTA requires them to 
maintain the minimum standards described in the agreement); James A.R. 
Nafziger, NAFTA’s Regime for Intellectual Property: In the Mainstream of Public 
International Law, 19 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 807, 815–16 (1997) (stressing that 
NAFTA members diverge on details regarding trademarks); see also NAFTA, 
supra note 19, art. 1701 (indicating that members must adhere to the standards 
set forth in NAFTA, but may create their own trademark registration systems). 
 140. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 141. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in 
the Americas: A Work in Progress, 14 NW. J. INT‘L. L. & BUS. 493, 493–96 (1994) 
(discussing the 1990 initiation of NAFTA negotiations between the United 
States and Mexico); Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements in the 
Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 683, 697 (1993) (discussing 
the proposal of NAFTA in the 1990s); Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case 
of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 817, 821 (1993) 
(noting Mexico‘s desire to be a part of the NAFTA). 
 142. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 143. Id. 
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integrated market because material differences in product 
quality can theoretically operate as a barrier to intra-NAFTA 
trade and ultimately undermine the scope of national rules on 
international trademark first sale.144  Moreover, the 
harmonization of technical standards across NAFTA 
members only partially eliminates barriers to intra-NAFTA 
trade, such as existing differences in product standards or 
requirements.145 NAFTA members also do not adopt a 
principle of mutual recognition as extensive as the principle 
developed by the ECJ and implemented in the EU (EEA).146  
Nevertheless, although still at the national level, all NAFTA 
members adopt domestic policies to reduce the impact of the 
materially different quality argument on international 
imports.147  Specifically, appropriate labeling can cure 
material product differences and allow the importation of 
qualitatively different gray market goods into the Canadian 
and the U.S. markets while Mexican law does not seem to 
prevent the admissibility into Mexico of any products, also 
materially different, as long as the importers have not altered 
the products.148  Furthermore, NAFTA members do not create 
a ―fortress NAFTA‖ against parallel imports from outside 
their free trade area and apply the principle of international 
exhaustion to all products worldwide.149  Still, the strong 
 
 144. For a similar conclusion, see Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 329 (comparing 
the NAFTA and EU trading blocks). 
 145. See NAFTA, supra note 19, Ch. 7B on sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (SPS), and Ch. 9 on technical barriers to trade (TBT).  See also 
Maureen Irish, Regulatory Convergence, Security and Global Administrative 
Law in Canada-United States Trade, 12 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 333, 339 (2009) 
(providing a detailed analysis of these and other provisions related to NAFTA 
SPS and TBT measures). 
 146. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 714; see also Irish, supra note 145, at 
339–40.  ―Both SPS and TBT provisions in NAFTA contain explicit obligations 
to recognize measures of other NAFTA Parties as equivalent.‖  Id. at 339.  
―Neither go as far as the Cassis de Dijon decision . . . which interprets the ban 
on measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions . . . as requiring that any 
products lawfully produced or marketed in the Community must also have free 
access to the rest of the Community unless they would harm legitimate 
interests in the importing state . . . .‖  Id. at 339 n.28.  For a position in favor of 
creating a full NAFTA common market, see WENDY DOBSON, C.D. HOWE 
INSTITUTE, THE BORDER PAPERS, NO. 162, SHAPING THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC SPACE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (Toronto 2002), 
available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_162.pdf. 
 147. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 330. 
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reliance on national rules by NAFTA members continues to 
characterize NAFTA as a fragile market integrated area, 
where national interest could easily prevail upon the 
principle of free movement of goods across NAFTA members 
and undermine the very purpose of the free trade area. 
By contrast, the process of market integration in the 
European Union led EU (EEA) members to necessarily 
abandon their individual national policies and to harmonize 
national laws with respect to trademark exhaustion as well 
as technical standards to remove any disguised barriers to 
effective European trade.150  EEA-wide trademark exhaustion 
has thus become the rule applicable to all EU (EEA) 
members.151  To fill any remaining gap and avoid disguised 
restrictions to the free movement of goods in the EU (EEA), 
the ECJ developed the principle of mutual recognition and 
repeatedly ruled that products should be allowed in the 
market of any EU (EEA) country if they comply with the 
standards of the country where they were first marketed.152  
Only very serious concerns relating to health, security, or 
public policy in member countries can supersede this 
principle and prevent intra-EEA trade.153  As a result, 
products can freely circulate within the European market 
without any barriers, even when they are materially different 
in quality.154  Nevertheless, this integration does not extend 
beyond the territory of EEA members; goods are free to move 
within the EEA but genuine products coming from outside 
―fortress Europe‖ can be legally stopped at the will of 
trademark owners.155  Ultimately, this solution reduces the 
scope of trademark exhaustion exclusively to European trade 
and permits market partitioning outside the EEA by the 
same multinational corporations that distribute goods under 
the principle of regional exhaustion within EU (EEA) 
 
 150. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 151. See Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See TFEU, supra note 106, art. 36; Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
 154. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 155. See, e.g., Carl Steele, “Fortresse Europe” for Trademark Owners, 1998 
TRADEMARK WORLD 14 (Aug. 1998) (summarizing the relevance of the ECJ‘s 
decision in Silhouette in creating a closed trading block among member 
countries). 
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members.156  At the regional level, however, the EU (EEA) 
solution constitutes a stronger and more definite approach 
than NAFTA to facilitate trade among members of a free 
trade area, although merely at the EU (EEA) level. 
B. The Successful Recipe for Market Integration Beyond 
Trademark First Sale 
In light of the above, the following considerations can 
thus be derived with respect to the relationship between the 
exercise of trademark rights, free trade, and the principle of 
trademark first sale to promote effective market integration 
and the free movements of goods within the territory of free 
trade areas. 
Generally, the comparative analysis of NAFTA and the 
EU directly demonstrates that effective free movement of 
goods in free trade areas cannot be achieved by relying 
exclusively on the principle of trademark first sale, even if 
countries nominally adopt national rules of international or 
regional trademark exhaustion.  As this Article has 
highlighted, material product differences can jeopardize free 
trade in free trade areas when countries prevent the 
importation of gray market products because of these 
material quality differences.  The adoption of uniform rules 
on either international or regional trademark first sale still 
remains, however, the primary condition that is necessary for 
creating an effective system of free movement of products 
across members of free trade areas.157  In contrast, if 
members of free trade areas adopt domestic rules in favor 
only of national exhaustion, or practice non-uniform regimes 
of international and regional exhaustion, this would result in 
preventing regional trade altogether.  In particular, if 
members of a free trade area practice only national 
trademark exhaustion, this would necessarily prevent any 
parallel trade among members.  Similarly, if they adopt non-
uniform exhaustion regimes, the goods lawfully imported 
from outside the free trade area into the territory of the 
 
 156. Critically, on this aspect of the principle of the EEA-wide exhaustion, 
see Calboli, supra note 2, at 87–90. 
 157. See Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998).  ―This, moreover, is the only 
interpretation which is fully capable of . . . safeguard[ing] the functioning of the 
internal market.‖  Id. at para. 27. 
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members practicing international trademark exhaustion 
would not be allowed into members practicing regional 
exhaustion, which would in turn jeopardize free trade within 
the whole free trade area.158  As this Article has illustrated, 
both NAFTA and the EU adopt uniform national positions—
international and EEA-wide exhaustion for NAFTA and EU 
(EEA) members, respectively.159  Hence, the problem of non-
uniform national rules was precisely at the heart of the 
discussions that ultimately led the ECJ to clarify that EEA-
wide exhaustion is the only applicable rule for all members, 
even for those previously practicing international 
exhaustion.160 
Beyond requiring the adoption of uniform rules on 
trademark first sale, the comparison of NAFTA and the EU 
indicates, however, that effective market integration in free 
trade areas also requires the elimination of other barriers to 
trade so as to permit the parallel trade of all genuine 
products across members, even when those products carry 
differences in their material quality.161  Generally, one of the 
primary objectives under international trade law and policy—
the harmonization, or at least the approximation, of national 
product standards—can eventually eliminate these barriers 
and facilitate free trade.162  Undoubtedly, the adoption of 
uniform standards would diminish the need for 
manufacturers to adapt their products to different national 
markets and it would impose compliance with certain 
common product standards across different jurisdictions.163  
Still, this harmonization would be a lengthy process that also 
requires compromises and changes in national standards, 
which in turn can increase the opposition against free trade 
and free trade agreements at the national level.164  
Furthermore, the harmonization of national standards will 
 
 158. See Calboli, supra note 2, at 60–66. 
 159. See discussion supra Part III.A–B. 
 160. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See, e.g., Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of 
Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of 
Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823, 823 (2002). 
 163. Id. at 824. 
 164. See id. at 823–24 (arguing in this context with respect to NAFTA and 
the WTO that ―decades of popular political movements . . . have struggled to 
ensure that those who will live with the results are able to control the process 
and outcomes of important policy decisions‖). 
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not eliminate all product differences across separate 
jurisdictions.  Trademark owners do not differentiate their 
goods merely to satisfy different national standards.  As 
mentioned earlier, they often adapt products to domestic 
preferences and tastes, or simply use different ingredients 
based on local competition or basic costs.165  These differences 
will continue to exist even in the ideal (and remote) situation 
where national requirements are fully harmonized, and 
trademark owners will continue to use these differences to try 
to prevent unauthorized channeling of their products across 
separate countries, and to segment the international market 
altogether.166 
Ultimately, the comparative analysis of NAFTA and the 
EU demonstrates that effective market integration among 
members of free trade areas may be achieved only if, 
alongside the process of harmonization of national product 
standards, members adopt at least one of the following 
approaches.  First, as exemplified by the position taken in the 
EU (EEA), members of free trade areas can promote free 
trade in their areas by implementing national principles of 
mutual recognition and by accepting into their territory gray 
market goods from other members as long as these goods 
comply with the product requirements of their country of 
origin.167  Unlike the harmonization of national standards, 
the mutual recognition of the quality of goods coming from 
other members of free trade areas does not require changes in 
national standards.  In contrast, mutual recognition only 
 
 165. It is generally known, for example, that the traditional Coca-Cola 
beverage made in Mexico is different from the same beverage distributed in the 
U.S. market.  See Louise Chu, Is The Mexican Coke the Real Thing?, SAN DIEGO 
UNION TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/unio
ntrib/20041109/news_1b9mexcoke.html. 
The Mexican Coca-Cola soda is made with sugar cane sweetener.  Id.  In 
the United States, the Coca-Cola Company stopped using cane sugar in the 
1980s because of rising cost and started using corn syrup instead.  Id.  Still, 
numerous American consumers prefer the Mexican version of the Coca-Cola 
beverage over the U.S. version because of the sweeter taste and intentionally 
purchase the Mexican Coca-Cola precisely because of its material different 
quality when they see the Mexican products on the shelves of U.S. stores.  Id.  
On the differences between Mexican and U.S. Coca-Cola and the reaction of 
U.S. consumers, see id. 
 166. See id.  
 167. Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition?  Standardization and 
Regional Integration Under Article XXIV of GATT, 6 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 459 
(2003). 
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requires the acceptance of the importation of those goods, 
even though they may be of materially different quality than 
the products distributed nationally, so long as they comply 
with fundamental national requirements, such as national 
security, safety, and public health related standards.168  The 
acceptance of this principle, however, may prove controversial 
within national jurisdictions because it treats imported goods 
differently from the products distributed nationally.169  As 
some authors have noted, this principle may even conflict 
with the non-discrimination and most-favored-nation 
principles that all WTO members are supposed to follow as 
part of their GATT, WTO, and TRIPS obligations.170  
Accordingly, although undoubtedly useful to promote free 
trade at the regional level, this solution seems less preferred 
for members of free trade areas. 
Second, perhaps less controversial and immediately more 
effective is the approach of allowing the importation of 
qualitatively different gray market products into the 
territories of members of free trade areas so long as the 
products are properly labeled by the importers and comply 
with the fundamental requirements of national security, 
safety, and public health.  Under this approach, which is 
currently applied by Canada and the United States, third 
party unauthorized importers of materially different gray 
market products are required to specify the different 
 
 168. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 169. See generally Irish, supra note 145, at 350 (stating that ―[f]or [mutual 
recognition] to work effectively, regulators from the involved countries must 
trust each other and accept that they have obligations extending beyond 
responsibilities to their own citizenries‖). The tension between mutual 
recognition and national standards ―is especially significant for mutual 
recognition of conformity assessments in which testing, inspection, verification 
or monitoring of compliance is done in one country and recognized in others.‖  
Id. 
 170. Because of its limited scope, this Article does not provide an exhaustive 
analysis of the tension between the principle of mutual recognition and the 
principle of non-discrimination, most-favored nation, and national treatment 
under GATT, the WTO, and TRIPS.  Generally, it has been affirmed that the 
EU principle of mutual recognition is compatible with GATT and WTO 
principles, although some doubts in this respect have been raised during the 
recent enlargement of the EU. On these important aspects, see Lorand Bartels, 
The Legality of the EC Mutual Recognition Clause Under WTO Law, 8 J. INT‘L. 
ECON. L. 691 (2005); Kalypso Nicolaidis, Non-Discriminatory Mutual 
Recognition: An Oxymoron in the New WTO Lexicon?, in REGULATORY BARRIERS 
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 267 (2000). 
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characteristics of the products and disclaim that their 
distribution is not authorized by trademark owners.171  By 
using appropriate labels, unauthorized importers can thus 
easily dispel any likelihood of consumer confusion as to the 
quality of the imported products and prevent any alleged 
harm that the public could suffer because of the sale of these 
unauthorized gray market goods.172  Notably, these labels 
allow consumers to clearly identify the differences among the 
products offered for sale, respectively, by trademark owners 
and by unauthorized importers under the same mark in the 
same national markets.  Consumers can then base their 
purchases on an informed judgment about these respective 
products and their different qualities.173  As stressed before, 
despite trademark owners‘ opposition to parallel imports, the 
sale of genuine products outside authorized channels of 
distribution do not alter or modify products per se—products 
remain in the same form as when the trademark owners 
originally distributed them, even if in a foreign market.174  
These sales also do not cause detriment to the traditional 
functions of the marks because the marks continue to indicate 
to consumers the commercial origin and the quality of the 
products as if they were distributed by trademark owners.175  
Although less controversial and immediately more effective, 
this solution remains nevertheless imperfect.  In a completely 
integrated market, as currently in the EU (EEA), materially 
different genuine products should be able to move regardless 
of ad hoc labels disclosing their differences.  Still, this 
solution clearly represents the easier solution, to date, to 
 
 171. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 172. In Canada, see Consumers Distributing Co. Ltd. v. Seiko Time Canada 
Ltd. (1984), 1 C.P.R. 3d 1, 13–14 (Can. S.C.C.); Nestle Enterprises Ltd. v. Edan 
Sales Inc. (1991), 37 C.P.R. 3d 480 (Can. F.C.A.).  In the United States, see 
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50. 
 173. See Chu, supra note 165.  ―While the flavor of Mexican Coke provides a 
taste of nostalgia for immigrants hundreds of miles from home, its retro green-
tinted contour glass bottles have also caught on among some baby boomers, who 
can recall a time when their cola was made with sugar.‖  Id.  ―Coca-Cola 
downplays the appeal of the cane sugar version, insisting that ‗there‘s not a 
perceivable taste difference between Mexican Coke and Coke bottled in the 
U.S.‘ . . . [b]ut fans of the import claim there‘s a world of a difference.‖  Id.  ―Rob 
Boyce . . . discovered the drink while living for a time in Yuma, Ariz. . . . Now 
back in Georgia, Boyce savors the few Mexican Cokes that he comes across, 
sipping carefully rather than guzzling what he considers a treat.‖  Id. 
 174. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50. 
 175. Id. 
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achieve effective market integration in free trade areas 
compatible with the principles of trademark territoriality and 
national sovereignty. 
In summary, although fiercely opposed by multinational 
corporations because of the additional pressure that gray 
market goods create for their business, ―the territorial 
approach of trademark law and the interests of international 
trade do not form irreconcilable contradictions.‖176  As this 
Article has reiterated, trademark rights do not permit 
trademark owners to control the distribution of products after 
their first sale in the market.177  To grant this control to 
trademark owners would create an unjustified monopoly 
against the rights of purchasers to dispose of their lawfully 
acquired products and resell them as they see convenient.  
Accordingly, when national interests prompt individual 
countries to enter free trade agreements to take advantage of 
the benefits of free trade, this principle needs to extend to the 
whole territory of the regional block of countries that are 
members of these agreements.  Consequently, the national 
exercise of trademark rights should not interfere with the free 
movement of goods across this territory so long as products 
are genuine and importers have not altered their quality.  
Likewise, multinational corporations should not object to the 
free movement of genuine products across this territory by 
relying on (often minimal) differences in the quality of their 
products, particularly when labels or other notices can 
properly inform consumers about these product differences.  
To the contrary, the proper functioning of free trade in free 
trade areas would be jeopardized and trademark protection 
would wrongfully exceed its scope to the detriment of 
competition and consumers.178 
V. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between international trade and 
trademark rights is a complex one.  Despite trademark 
owners‘ desires to control the future distribution of the 
products that they have introduced into the market, 
trademark law was never intended to grant trademark 
 
 176. Beier, supra note 1, at 71. 
 177. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 178. Beier, supra note 1, at 71–72. 
CALBOLI_FINAL 5/31/2011  5:53 PM 
1282 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:51 
owners this control.  Although generally accepted at the 
national level, this principle has been fiercely debated 
internationally due to the strong interests of multinational 
corporations in preventing arbitrage in consumer goods from 
low-cost to high-cost countries and maximizing profits across 
separate jurisdictions.  Hence, free trade is a fundamental 
component of the modern economy and the free movement of 
goods is a fundamental component of free trade, which 
requires the limitation of the exercise of national trademark 
rights when these rights act as barriers to free trade. 
Different trade areas in the world have adopted different 
solutions with respect to the application of the principle of 
trademark first sale, or trademark exhaustion, to promote 
regional market integration.  The analysis of the market 
integration achieved, respectively, by NAFTA and EU (EEA) 
members indicates that regional market integration requires, 
at a minimum, the adoption of uniform national rules 
providing for the exhaustion of trademark rights 
internationally or, at least, within the territory of members of 
a free trade area.  Effective integration in free trade areas 
may be jeopardized, however, when material differences in 
product quality operate as barriers to trade among members, 
even if members uniformly practice international or regional 
trademark exhaustion.  The harmonization, or at least the 
approximation, of national standards alongside the mutual 
recognition of product characteristics, or the acceptance into 
national markets of materially different gray market products 
from other members with appropriate labels disclosing these 
differences, can nevertheless overcome these barriers.  
Ultimately, to invoke trademark protection to segment the 
market against the parallel trade of genuine goods across 
members not only undermines the purpose of free trade 
areas; it also goes against the general scope of trademark 
protection, which protects consumers against confusion and 
trademark owners against illegitimate actions that could take 
unfair advantage of, or damage, the reputation of the marks, 
and does not prohibit the resale of genuine goods that 
trademark owners themselves have introduced into the 
market, even if in the territory of another member of a free 
trade area. 
